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APPLICATION OF THE STATES-OF-MIND MODEL WITHIN RATIONAL 
EMOTIVE BEHAVIOR THEORY 
 





 Understanding the role of positive and negative cognitions in psycho-emotional 
adjustment is essential to improve the effectiveness of CBT practice.  Schwartz and 
Garamoni (1986; 1987) proposed a model for the dynamic relationship of negative and 
positive cognitions based on the golden-section hypothesis or the optimal balance: The 
States-Of-Mind Model (SOM).  The model proposes an asymmetrical balance of positive 
and negative cognitions represented numerically by the golden-section ratio of .62 
positive to .38 negative cognitions [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions)].  
To date, the SOM model has mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts 
or self-statement, which represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a 
person’s emotional experience (DiGiuseppe, David, & Venezia, 2016).  The model has 
not been used with more enduring trait like cognitive measures such as dysfunctional 
attitudes, irrational beliefs, or schema.  The current study tested the validity of the States-
of-Mind model (SOM) with irrational and rational beliefs of Ellis’ Rational Emotive 
Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994).  
This study tested the SOM ratios using REBT framework by analyzing survey 
data from 221 participants on their self-reports of Rational and Irrational Beliefs 
(RBs/IBs), psychopathology and life satisfaction.  Past research on the SOM has 
supported the presence of psychopathology in individuals whose ratios are lower than the 
optimal golden-section proportion of .62 (Kendal, Howard & Hayes, 1989; Michelson, 
Schwartz & Marchione, 1991).  Replicating past research, lower belief SOM ratios in this 
study were linked to higher levels of psychopathology. However, the optimal balance set 
point of .62 was not confirmed.  Our research findings support the original formulation of 
Schwartz and Garamoni’s work in that individuals balance their cognitive states 
asymmetrically, but the asymmetry index was higher than the theorized optimal ratio 
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The study tested the validity of the States-of-Mind model (SOM) with irrational 
and rational beliefs of Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994).  
The SOM model is an integrative model of positive and negative cognitions based on the 
golden-section hypothesis, information processing theory, personal construct theory, and 
cognitive-behaviorism (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).  The model proposes that 
individuals balance their cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation 
system that is represented optimally by the golden-section ratio of .62 positive to .38 
negative cognitions [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions)].  The golden-
section balance of negative and positive cognitions is theorized to support optimal 
information processing where negative cognitions are especially salient against a mostly 
positive cognitive backdrop (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).  Based on the model, 
sustained deviation from the golden-section balance, in either positive or negative 
direction, represent the presence of psychological and emotional maladjustment 
(Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).  
Past research on the SOM has supported the presence of psychopathology in 
individuals whose ratios are significantly lower than the optimal golden-section 
proportion of .62 (Kendal et al., 1989; Michelson et al., 1991); however, research has not 
found support for maladjustment within the upper limits of positive proportions 
(McDermut & Haaga, 1994).  On the contrary, a linear relationship was found between 
increasing positive ratios and measures of adjustment (Amsel & Fichten, 1998; Friedman, 
2000).  
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The SOM has mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts or self-
statement, which represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a person’s 
emotional experience (DiGiuseppe et al., 2016).  The model has not been used with more 
enduring trait-like cognitive measures, such as dysfunctional attitudes, irrational beliefs, 
or schema.  I hypothesize that by assessing stable cognitive constructs, such as irrational 
(IBs) and rational beliefs (RBs) within the REBT framework, we will find support for the 
SOM golden-section (optimal balance) hypothesis.  Moreover, REBT’s focus on the 
evaluative nature of cognitions fits in with the original formulation of the golden-section 
hypothesis within personal construct theory, which focused on measuring binary 
judgments and evaluations rather than negative and positive cognitions (Benjafield & 
Adams-Webber, 1976; Lefebvre, 1985). 
To test the golden-section hypothesis within the REBT framework, we will apply 
the SOM ratios to data of an adult sample who have completed the DRLG Short Form 
(DiGiuseppe et al., 2020) of the Attitude and Beliefs Scale-2 (ABS-2: DiGiuseppe et al., 
2018).  The DRLG was developed specifically to assess irrational and rational beliefs 
within the REBT framework (DiGiuseppe, et al., 2018).  The SOM ratios derived from 
the DRLG were tested within the paradigm of the model and correlated with measures of 
psychological dysfunction and adjustment. 
The SOM model is important in applied psychology as well as the practice of 
school psychology because of the model’s ability to conform to any assessment tool that 
delineates between positive and negative constructs.  The SOM can be applied to measure 
dichotomous cognitions, affect, personality traits, or beliefs.  The use of ratios allows for 
the application of tracking treatment outcomes across not only assessment tools but also 
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types of interventions.  The utilization of the SOM paradigm with psychotherapeutic 
treatment could yield information into the mechanism of change as well as styles of 
information processing (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).   The current study will extend 






Why cognitions matter in the application of psychotherapeutic treatments 
The target of most cognitive psychotherapies is cognitions, thoughts, attitudes, 
scheme, or beliefs that are inherently private experiences (Lubinski & Thompson, 1993).  
As private events, thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes can only be measured indirectly 
(DiGiuseppe et al., 2016).  Despite this difficulty of measurement, the field of cognitive 
behavior therapy (CBT) has a burgeoning amount of research on the efficacy of 
psychotherapeutic interventions.  Today CBT is considered the gold standard in 
psychotherapy because of the amount of research supporting its efficacy and 
effectiveness (David et al., 2018). CBTs have been shown affective on par with 
pharmacological interventions in treating many psychopathologies, most notably anxiety 
and mood disorders (Chiang, et al., 2017; Franklin, et al., 2015; Heuzenroeder, et al., 
2004; Kennard, et al., 2008).   
In order to improve symptoms of anxiety or mood disorder, CBT therapists work 
to adjust their patients’ negative cognitions, which are theorized to lead to distressing 
emotions and maladaptive behaviors (DiGiuseppe et al., 2018).  Negative (contributing) 
and positive (protective) cognitions are seen as important aspects of the way people 
organize and process information (Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989).  Understanding the role 
of positive and negative cognitions in psychological adjustment is essential to improve 
the effectiveness of CBT practice.  Research in this area has shown a clear link of 
negative automatic thoughts and cognitive errors to psychopathology and corresponding 
positive cognitions to well-being (Beck, 1963; Beevers et al.,  2007; Chakhssi, et al., 
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2018; Teasdale, 1983) and the relationship of IB to disturbance and RBs to well-being 
(David, Christea, & Hoffman, 2018).  
 The idea of considering positive and negative cognitions simultaneously was 
formally introduced in the late 1980s by Schwartz and Garamoni’s SOM model (1986, 
1989).  They attempted to understand whether there is a dynamic relationship between 
contributory (e.g., I’m worthless) and protective (e.g., I matter) cognitions when 
considering the improvement of symptoms documented in CBT research. 
The States of Mind Model (SOM) 
The SOM model proposes that individuals balance their positive and negative 
cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation system represented with a ratio 
[positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions).  The computation for the ratio and 
the chosen ‘cut-off’ point of optimal balance was inspired by the research of Benjafield 
and Adams-Webber’s golden-section hypothesis, which applied the concept of the 
‘divine proportion’ and the Pythagorean notion of human internal balance to the study of 
cognitive evaluation (1976).  The ‘divine proportion’ is defined in mathematics as a point 
on a line that divides the line so that the proportion of the smaller segment is to the larger 
segment as the larger segment is to the whole, or roughly that the larger portion is 62% of 
the whole.   The Pythagorean notion of human internal balance proposed the idea of 
perfect equilibrium, which is reached by the optimal tension of opposites within one 
body.   
Schwartz and Garamoni theorized that asymmetry in the computational balance 
must exist within the human cognitive experience to allow a person to optimally identify 
important negative events, which might prove detrimental to their well-being, against the 
 6 
backdrop of mostly positive mental events.  Subsequently, they hypothesized that 
psychopathology arises when the internal computational system for information 
processing sustains a prolonged shift from the optimal cognitive balance.  For example, 
the SOM model would help identify that in depression, the overwhelming number of 
negative cognitions drowns out positive events or that in mania, the lack of negative 
thoughts minimizes the existence of short-comings.  Overall, the idea of internal 
cognitive balance is an intriguing and unique way to conceptualize cognitive information 
processing as well as the mechanism of cognitive and behavioral change within CBT 
treatment. 
Background research that influenced the conceptualization of the SOM 
The golden-section hypothesis assumes a central role in the SOM model.  The 
golden-section hypothesis was first proposed in the work of Benjafield and Adams-
Webber.  Benjafield and Adams-Webber (1976) combined the golden-section proportion 
with the Pythagorean notion of balance in human experience to formulate the golden-
section hypothesis.  The golden-section is more famously known as the golden ratio (both 
are the same mathematical concept only inversely calculated).  The golden-section has 
been extensively studied since the ancient Greek mathematician, Euclid, and fittingly 
designated as the ‘divine proportion.’  The golden-section can be found in our everyday 
life aesthetically as the proportion of books, TV screens, buildings, much of art, and 
movie images (Benjafield & Adams-Webber, 1976).  The second idea, essential to the 
golden-section hypothesis, is the doctrine of the ancient Greek philosopher, Pythagoras.  
Within the Pythagorean theory, the human body was thought to maintain a perfect 
proportion of dichotomous tendencies (Benjafield & Adams-Webber, 1976).  Pythagoras, 
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as described by Plato, held a belief that human experience was kept in a state of balance 
through constant tension between pairs of opposites.  Both the Pythagorean doctrine of 
opposites and the golden-section are ideas of a tangible, perfect balance.  In combining 
these ideas, the golden-section lends a numerical value, and therefore a testable anchor to 
the Pythagorean concept of a perfect balance of opposites within the human experience. 
Benjafield and Adams-Webber (1976) tested the golden-section hypothesis by 
experimentally assessing the spontaneous balance of dichotomous choice.  The authors 
replicated a repertory grid task, first introduced in the work on personal construct by 
George Kelly (1955).  The repertory grid task consists of role titles (e.g., Self, Mother, 
Father, etc.) that are judged by the subject on dimensions of dichotomous adjectives (e.g., 
bold-timid, active-passive, etc.).  The dichotomous adjectives are scored 0 for the 
negative pole and 1 for the positive pole.  Within a line segment between 0 and 1, the 
golden-section falls at the value of .618.  Benjafield and Adams-Webber used this 
procedure in five studies.  All five studies used university students to perform the 
repertory grid task.  In each study, participants chose the positive adjective to evaluate 
themselves and others with a probability between 61% and 63%.  The authors concluded 
that individuals tend to organize their judgment by approximating the golden-section 
ratio of .62 positive evaluations to .38 negative evaluations.  Thus, the golden-section 
hypothesis represented the mathematically defined, perfect balance of the human 
evaluation process, and the dichotomous judgment of the self and others.  The authors 
supposed that the asymmetrical balance of evaluations was an evolutionary adaptation, 
allowing the individual to pay special attention to negative events.  
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Following Benjafield and Adams-Webber, Vladimir A. Lefebvre (1985) sought 
mathematical support for the golden-section hypothesis that human evaluative cognitions 
operate within a mechanism of dichotomized choice with a balance of choosing the 
positive pole 62% of the time.  Lefebvre used computer and mathematical models of 
ethical choice and found evidence that the constant appeared whenever an evaluative 
choice between poles was present regardless of what was the subject or object of the 
evaluation.  According to Lefebvre, the explanation for the constant in the data supported 
the existence of a computation mechanism at the base cognitive processes engaged in 
evaluation.  
Testing the SOM hypothesis in CBT 
Schwartz and Garamoni’s SOM research investigated whether the golden-section 
could be detected as the optimal balance of negative and positive cognitions.  To test this 
hypothesis, Schwartz and Garmoni (1986) evaluated the SOM model against aggregated 
data from 27 meta-analyses of CBT outcome studies.  The majority of the included 
studies utilized self-statement questionnaires to measure positive and negative cognitions.  
The model to test the golden-section hypothesis within CBT consisted of five categories 
of ratio indices.  The indices were meant to serve as a discriminatory tool between people 
of varying psychological adjustment.  The dialogic indices tested were positive dialogue 
with a .62 ratio (ranging .56 to .68) that reflected the golden section ratio and presumably 
the healthiest balance; the internal dialogue of conflict had symmetrical balance and 
therefore a .50 ratio (ranging .45 to .55); the negative dialogue had a ratio of .38 
(ranging .32 to .44).  The positive and negative monologue indexes were also tested with 
ranges of .69 or higher and .37 or lower, respectively.   
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The results of the model analyses supported the SOM model but not the exact set 
index boundaries. As defined by clinically significant scores on measures of 
psychological adjustment, dysfunctional cases had an average ratio of .45.  Moreover, 
significant differences were noted for several variables between dysfunctional cases and 
participants within the positive dialogue range (.56 to .68).  These findings supported the 
supposition that negative cognitions were a feature of depressed and anxious individuals.  
Overall, the study found a relationship between an individual’s functioning to the 
quantity of positive versus negative cognitions. Individuals who were functioning better 
indicated higher SOM ratios. At the same time, those who suffered clinically significant 
distress had SOM ratios within the negative dialogue range.  However, the SOM 
hypothesis stated that ratios above the golden section value of .62 would indicate 
psychological distress, and this was simply not the case. On the contrary, SOM ratios 
within the positive monologue range (>.69) were linked to psychological adjustment and 
well-being.   
Despite somewhat unfavorable findings, a series of studies have appeared that test 
the SOM model using Beck’s (Beck & Haight, 2014) constructs of negative automatic 
thoughts and positive automatic thoughts. SOM was repeatedly supported as an indicator 
of the severity of psychopathology in children and adults. The results of the model 
analysis also supported the distinction between healthy and unhealthy SOM ratios.   
Overall, emotionally distressed children and adults were found to report significantly 
more negative cognitions than the controls (Hogendoorn et al., 2012; Ronan & Kendal, 
1997; Kendall et al., 1989). 
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The SOM ratios was reported to distinguish between normal and distressed 
children, predicting performance or treatment outcomes, and enable tracking of 
incremental progress as well as provide information on the mechanism of change by 
considering positive, negative cognitions and their relationship to each other. Anxious 
children were found to have more negative thoughts than controls, and conversely had 
fewer positive thoughts than controls, resulting in lower SOM ratios than controls 
(Hogendoorn et al., 2012). Additionally, children identified as anxious had SOM ratios in 
the internal dialogue range with an average value ranging from .45 to .47 in both anxiety 
specific and depression specific content measures while control subjects’ SOM scores 
ranged, on average, between .63 and .65, in both content areas (Ronan & Kendal, 1997). 
Research on the SOM was consistent in illustrating the utility of the SOM ratios 
for predicting performance or treatment outcomes.  Arnkoff et al. (1992) found SOM 
ratios to be a stronger predictor of anxiety over self-efficacy measures in a sample of 
graduate students before the oral examination. Investigation of whether SOM ratios 
would predict the psychotherapeutic change in a sample of depressed patients found that 
SOM ratios in pre-treatment positively predicted outcomes beyond the presence of 
personality disorder, educational achievement, and severity of depression (Baggett, 
1994).  In study of a large sample of undergraduates found that the ratio predicted the 
difference in the severity of symptoms beyond consideration of exclusively negative or 
exclusively positive cognitions, providing further support for the predictive value of 
SOM ratios in the application of treatment (Wong, 2010).   
When used to track treatment progress,  SOM ratios were successful in indicating 
individuals who had improved. Additionally, higher SOM ratios were linked to better 
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overall outcomes. For example, Schwartz and Michelson (1987) tracked the changes in 
the SOM ratio throughout the treatment of patients with agoraphobia.  In pre-treatment, 
the average SOM ratio for all patients was .437, falling into the negative dialogue range.  
By mid-treatment, patients’ average SOM ratio rose to .66, and to .70 at 3-month follow 
up. Similar results were found when investigating the shift of SOM ratios in subjects with 
agoraphobia before, during, and after treatment. Patients with agoraphobia were 
functioning better with higher than expected SOM ratios (.62 or positive dialogue) at the 
end of CBT treatment (Michelson et al., 1991).  The treatment group was further divided 
into high-end state and low-end state groups based on the overall level of improvement 
gauged by a decrease in symptoms.  The high-end state group’s symptoms decreased by 3 
- 4 points, while low-end state group’s symptoms decreased by 0-2 points.  At follow-up, 
the high-end state group had, on average, a ratio of .817, and the low-end state group had 
on the average ratio of .69.  Both groups had improvements to the SOM ratio within the 
positive monologue range, which is higher than the expected .62 optimal balance ratio. 
When investigating a group of depressed patients in treatment, similar results were found 
with successful treatment linked to high SOM ratios.  Schwartz et al. (2002) divided their 
sample of depressed patients into two groups according to whether the individual’s 
depression remitted following treatment.  At the start of the study, both groups had, on 
average, a SOM ratio of .35.  Individuals who experienced a substantial reduction in 
symptoms following treatment had on average SOM of .74.  Subjects who did not attain 
significant remission of depression had on average SOM of .41. 
However, in predicting treatment progress, the maladaptive quality of high SOM 
ratios was repeatedly unsupported. For example, non-anxious children were found to 
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have  SOM’s on average of .80, while anxious children ranged from .67 to .70 
(Hogendoorn et al., 2012). These findings disputed the optimal balance hypothesis, at 
least in a sample of children as both anxious and healthy children in this sample had 
SOM ratios within the positive monologue range (>.69).  In another case, a college 
student sample participating in a public speaking class reported SOM ratios averaging .82 
on the measure of self-efficacy when in a supportive situation, which was an unexpected finding 
if an optimal ratio of .62 were to be found (Davison et al., 1991).   
 Kendall et al. (1989) found partial support for the SOM model when examining 
SOM ratios of normal, depressed, and hypomanic adult subjects.  Two sets of these three 
groups were used in the study for cross-validation.  The subjects in both normal groups 
were found to fall within the positive dialogue range (M = .63 and M = .64).  The 
subjects in both depressed groups scored in the negative dialogue range (M = .45 and M 
= .42).  The evidence supported the SOM model in differentiating between normal and 
depressed subjects. Conversely, the expectation of hypomanic subjects reporting ratios 
well above normal subjects was not found.  Both groups of hypomanic subjects scored 
within the positive dialogue range, the same as the normal subjects.  Thus, the hypothesis 
that higher SOM end states were maladaptive was unsupported. 
The SOM negative dialogue index (ranging .32 to .44) was repeatedly supported 
as an indicator of psychopathology in adults and at least one child sample (Kendall, 
Howard, & Hays, 1989; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986; Ronan & Kendall, 1997), but the 
hypothesis that ratios above .68 correspond to maladaptive states was not confirmed.  
Conversely to the optimal balance hypothesis, successful remission of symptoms of 
depression or anxiety were accompanied by SOM ratios within the positive dialogue 
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range to well into the positive monologue range.  Together, the research on the SOM 
ratio pointed to a linear relationship between increased protective cognitions and 
improved psychological well-being.  
Without the affirmation of the optimal balance hypothesis by identifying 
psychological distress within the positive monologue range (> .69) as predicted, the SOM 
hypothesis. Verifying a nonlinear relationship between positive ratios (>.68) and 
adaptation or adjustment is the single most important tenet of the SOM model. The SOM 
negative dialogue index (ranging .32 to .44) was supported in several studies as an 
indicator of psychopathology (Kendall et al., 1989; Schwartz et al., 2002; Ronan & 
Kendall, 1997), but the hypothesis that ratios above .68 correspond to maladaptive states 
was not confirmed.   
Schwartz (1992) acknowledged the incongruences of the optimal balance view 
with evidence in the research.  Schwartz proposed that ratios approaching the positive 
monologue range were protective for patients from potentially slipping back into a 
negatively skewed cognitive balance.  Schwartz updated the model in 1997 to include 
additional categories and new set points.  The refinements necessitated by research 
findings moved the indexes of what a balanced ratio was originally (.62) to a range of .63 
to .90 (Schwartz, 1997).  Schwartz reformulated Balanced State of Mind Model (BSOM) 
identifies .62 ratio as a subnormal function with two new designations: .72 ratio as 
normal functioning and .81 as optimal functioning.  The reformulated BSOM is 
comprised of seven qualitatively distinct categories.  Negative SOM ratios remained 
consistent, as research supported SOM’s ability to differentiate between the severity of 
psychopathology.  With the BSOM, Schwartz essentially abandoned the golden-section 
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ratio as an indicator of optimal balance in favor of the golden-section ratio as a cut-off 
point between individuals experiencing distress and those who are functioning normally. 
Research studies with the BSOM continued to find further support for the 
functionality of high positive ratios.  A study of 292 introductory psychology students 
found evidence for the protective factor of high SOM ratios (Bruch, 1997).  The study 
found that individuals who endorsed predominantly positive cognitions were less likely 
to be adversely affected by negative life events.  In a sample of French college students, 
higher SOM ratios (> .69) were associated with lower levels of depression and anxiety, 
with 70% of the sample falling within the positive monologue range (Alsaleh et al., 
2015).  Moreover, no presence of a curvilinear relationship between SOM ratio and an 
individual’s adaptation on various criterion measures was found, suggesting that even 
extremely positive states-of-mind are adaptive (Amsel & Fichten, 1998).  
Results from several studies suggested that the lower band within the positive 
monologue index was adaptive; however, it was acknowledged that the nature of 
cognitions assessed to play a role in the breakdown of the balance hypothesis (Schwartz, 
1993).  Of note, this analysis utilized situation and context-dependent measures like much 
of the research on the SOM. Eighteen out of the twenty-seven studies included in the 
original 1986 meta-analysis were studies assessing self-statements.  Automatic thoughts 
and self-statements are contextually and situationally dependent, unlike attitudes, schema, 
or beliefs (Beck et al., 1983) and  might not be representative of an underlying cognitive 
mechanism.  On the surface of situational and contextual dependent responses, 
individuals may very well function better in the realm of positive bias. However, it is 
possible that the positive bias, detectable on the surface, is not reflective of an underlying 
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cognitive process, best captured with stable cognitive constructs such as attitudes, 
schema, or beliefs. 
Evaluating SOM using More stable cognitive constructs, embedded within Ellis’ REBT 
Schwartz and Garmoni (1989) hypothesized that the golden-section balance is 
operating as a stabilizing cognitive-affective self-regulatory system.  A possible barrier to 
the SOM in the detection of the golden-section ratio in past research could be the focus 
on assessing self-statements rather than more stable cognitive constructs.  SOM has 
mainly been assessed with measures of automatic thoughts or self-statement, which 
represent more surface structure cognitions that are close to a person’s emotional 
experience (DiGiuseppe et al., 2016).  They have not been used with more enduring 
cognitive constructs, such as, dysfunctional attitudes, irrational beliefs, or schema.  
Additionally, the studies that preceded the SOM theory in testing the golden-section 
hypothesis were measuring evaluative components in judgment and thought rather than 
self-statements (e.g., Benjafield and Adams-Webber’s character evaluation and 
judgments; Lefebvre’s ethical evaluations).  REBT’s focus on the evaluative nature of 
cognitions fits in with the original formulation of the golden-section hypothesis, which 
focused on measuring binary judgments and evaluations (Benjafield & Adams-Webber, 
1976; Lefebvre, 1985).  One might find good support for the SOM golden-section 
hypothesis within an REBT framework by examining stable, evaluative aspects of beliefs 
rather than self-statements. 
In 1958, Abelson and Rosenberg (1958) introduced the terms “hot and cold” 
cognitions to differentiate between cognitive constructs.  They theorized that internal 
states (e.g., cognitions, beliefs etc.) are of two types: ones that process facts from the 
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outside world, which they termed cold cognitions, and those that form evaluations of 
what is happening in the outside world, which they called hot cognitions.  The 
differentiation of knowledge-based and evaluation-based thoughts lends itself to different 
assessments.  As mentioned above, measurements of automatic thoughts or self-
statements might not capture deep cognitions that are likely to be related to evaluative or 
‘hot” cognitions and be more sensitive to perceived facts that are not evaluations.     
SOM paradigm was applied to affective/emotional states.  Findings with affect 
mirrored the results of positive and negative cognition studies.  SOM ratios were 
effectively adapted to measures of affect where the quantity or ratio of positive and 
negative affective states would coincide with psychopathology.  Garamoni et al. (1991) 
found that affective ratio of 39 depressed males balanced at the same level as cognitions 
of depressed patients with a ratio in the negative dialogue range of .35.  Normal controls 
in this study averaged an affect ration of .78.  Garmoni et al. (1992) examined the shift in 
affective and cognitive SOM ratios of 32 depressed patients receiving CBT treatment. 
The sample was divided into two groups, responders and non-responders which was 
determined by independent clinical ratings.  The two groups did not differ on any 
demographic characteristics or the severity of symptoms before treatment.  The pre-
treatment affective ratio for both groups was .34.  The average affective ratio for 
responders was .65, while the average affective ratio for non-responders was .35, 
indicating no change from pre-treatment.  These findings reflected a similar pattern 
within affective ratios as was found in the ratios for thoughts of individuals in 
psychotherapeutic treatment. 
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All cognitive psychotherapies generally hold theoretical underpinning about how 
humans’ processing of information on their emotions and behavior (DiGiuseppe et al., 
2016).  Ellis’ REBT approaches the change process in psychotherapy by focusing on 
replacing more stable, hot cognitions, or irrational beliefs with rational beliefs and getting 
the individual to practice their newly formed rational beliefs.  Within the REBT 
framework, the focus is on targeting the evaluative component of the cognitions as the 
primary driver of emotional and behavioral upset (DiGiuseppe & Doyle, 2019), and as 






In the current study, we will examine the SOM model within the REBT 
framework.  We hypothesize that by assessing stable cognitive constructs, such as IBs 
and RBs within the REBT framework, we might find support for the SOM golden-section 
(optimal balance) hypothesis.   To test the golden-section hypothesis within the REBT 
framework, we applied the SOM ratios to data on an adult sample who have completed 
the DRLG, a measure irrational and rational beliefs within the REBT framework 
(DiGiuseppe et al, 2018).  The SOM ratios derived from the DRLG were tested within 
the paradigm of the model and correlated with measures of psycho-emotional dysfunction 
and adjustment. 
We hypothesize that: 
1. RB and IB SOM ratios will replicate previous findings of differentiating 
between healthy and unhealthy subjects, as indicated by self-reports of 
psychological distress.  
2. IBs will have a strong positive correlation with measures of disturbance; 
and will have a weak negative correlation with measures of life 
satisfaction.   
3. RBs will have a strong positive correlation with measures of life 
satisfaction and will have a weak negative correlation with measures of 
psychological distress.  
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4. IB and RB SOM ratios will replicate findings from previous research in 
that the ratios higher predictive value of psychological distress and life 
satisfaction beyond either IBs or RBs alone.  
5. We hypothesize that there will be a curvilinear relationship between 








Participants in this study were collected via an online survey.  The survey was 
distributed through social groups on a social media outlet (Facebook) and the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform.  The total sample consisted of 258 participants 
between the ages of 18 to 84 years old. The percentage of participants within each age 
range is reported in Figure 1. The sample was relatively evenly split between males 
(44.3%) and female participants (55.2%) (N= 212, Missing 46, 17.8%).  The sample was 
well educated, with 72.7 percent earning a four-year college degree or higher. Figure 2 
lists the percentage of participants in each category of educational attainment. The 
sample ethnicity was largely Caucasian (73.6%); all ethnicities are reported in Figure 3.   
Participants were largely residing within the United States (59.5 %), with two 
percent residing in South America and India, and thirty-eight percent choosing not to give 
their location. In terms of marital status, most of the sample was in a relationship (15.6%) 
or married (53.3%). Single participants made up the third-largest group (24.5%), and the 
remainder of the sample was either divorced/separated (4.2%), widowed (2.4%), or chose 
not to respond (17.8%).  We did not recruit participants from any clinical sample; 
however, we recognize that any sample recruited non-clinical group will have a certain 
proportion that are receiving mental health services.  Therefore, participants were also 
asked of their treatment status, with nine percent indicating that they were participating in 
psychotherapy and four percent indicating participation in a drug/alcohol dependence 
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treatment. In terms of psychotropic medication, ten percent (23 individuals) of 
participants indicated that they were currently prescribed psychotropic medication. 
Figure 1 
Demographics: Age. (n = 220) 
 
 Figure 2 




Demographics: Educational Attainment. (n – 173) 
 
Chi-square test of independence was performed to examine whether samples from 
the two sources differed on any demographic measures. A total of 221 participants fully 
completed the demographic data with 86 participants from the MTurk pool and 132 
participants from the Facebook pool. The two samples did not differ on measures of 
gender, X2(3, n = 221) = 6.64, p = .08; ethnicity, X2(6, n = 221) = 9.07, p = .17; 
education, X2(6, n = 221) = 5.95, p = .43; country, X2(77, n = 221) = 71.95, p = .64; 
marital status, X2(5, n = 221) = 7.36, p = .19.  The samples did however differ in age, 
X2(7, n = 221) = 22.40, p < .01, with MTurk participants being overall younger (92% of 
the sample younger than 54 years-of-age) than Facebook participants (70.4% of the 




Data for this study were collected from two sources, first the distribution of an 
electronic survey via social media, and second by recruiting on for participants on 
MTurk.  The social media outlet allowed for the survey to be posted to mental health 
disorder support groups and other nonclinical communities on Facebook and as well as 
larger communities to capture the greatest variance of well-being and psychopathology. 
Our participants were recruited via Facebook groups (e.g., Depression Support, Mental 
Illness Awareness, Its an Aquarius Thing). The pages’ administrators were sent a private 
message asking for permission to post a survey link. When permission was granted, the 
administrator of the page was sent a written introduction to the study as well as the link to 
the survey, which they were free to post on the page.  Social media sites, such as 
Facebook, have been shown as an effective and ethical recruitment tool (Kosinski et al., 
2015). Participants reached through social media completed the survey at will.  Two 
hundred and five participants began the survey via social media outlet of which one-
hundred seventy-two were retained.   In order to retain a survey completed via Facebook, 
the participant must have completed at least one section of the survey. A section of the 
survey demarcates a scale. Additionally, each participant's responses were evaluated for 
missing data. It was judged that a 3-4 percent of missing data within each section of the 
survey were permissible. The missing data was treated through mean substitution 
methods. 
MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace that makes it possible to reach 
participants for tasks, such as, survey participation.  Each MTurk participant was 
awarded a small fee for their time.  To test for inattentive responders, a validity question 
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was embedded within the survey as recommended by Oppenheimer et al. (2009).  All 
responses of participants who failed the attention check were removed from the data set.  
One hundred eighty-two people opened the survey on MTurk, and eighty-six were 
retained.  
Measures 
The electronic survey consisted of several measures, including demographic 
information, DRLG – short form, Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire, and 
Satisfaction with Life Scale. 
The DRLG is an abbreviated version of the Attitudes and Belief Scale -2 
(DiGiuseppe, Raptis, Gorman, Agiurgioaei-Boie, Agiurgioaei, Leaf, & Robin, 2020) that 
assessed RBs and IBs reflecting the most recent theory of Ellis’ Rational Emotive 
Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 1994).  The DRLG – short form was developed by 
DiGiuseppe, Robin, Leaf, and Gorman (2020).  The DRLG – short form consists of 24 
items within a 4 x 2 x 3 matrix. The measure consists of 4 irrational cognitive process 
subscales measuring Demandingness (DEM), Frustration-Intolerance (FI), Awfulizing 
AWF), and Self-Condemnation (SC), and four rationally worded cognitive process 
subscales measuring Non-Demanding Preferences (NDP), Frustration Tolerance (FT), 
Realistic Negative Evaluations(RNE), and Self-Acceptance.  Each of these eight 
subscales consists of three items, one from each context domains of achievement, 
affiliation, and comfort.  
The DRLG has excellent internal consistency and correlates significantly with a 
measure of psychopathology (DiGiuseppe, Raptis, Gorman, Agiurgioaei-Boie, 
Agiurgioaei, Leaf, & Robin, 2020).  Confirmatory Factor Analysis for an 8-factor model 
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matches the 8 subscales mentioned above.  A hierarchical model – has the four irrational 
scales load on to a second-order irrationality factor, and the four rationally worded 
subscales loading on to a rationality second-order factor.  Thus, the DRLG short form 
yields a Total Irrationality and Total Rationality score and eight subscales.  DRLG – 
short form has shown good to excellent internal consistency and concurrent validity with 
measures of mental health.  
Amsel and Fichten (1998) recommend that when calculating SOM ratios, a scale 
for deriving ratios must have a value of zero to capture the broadest possible range of 
ratios between 0 and 1. The DRLG scoring already included a zero point and thus reflects 
the broadest possible range for belief SOM ratios within this sample.   
The Belief SOM ratio for each participant was calculated by dividing their total 
rationality score by the total score [rational belief / (rational+ irrational beliefs)].  Indexes 
from the original formulation of the SOM hypothesis were used to compare belief SOM 
ratios to previous research. Average SOM ratios were calculated for the entire sample.  
Additionally, the sample was grouped based on PDSQ scale cut-offs scores within the 
depression and generalized anxiety indexes. Participants endorsing more symptoms than 
the cut-off score for each index were grouped as ‘unhealthy,’ while participants 
endorsing fewer symptoms than the cut-off score were grouped as ‘healthy.’  Average 
SOM ratios were calculated for each group within the two indexes: depression and 
anxiety.  
The Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire (PDSQ: Zimmerman & 
Mattia, 2001) is a self-report screening assessment of psychiatric disorders.  The PDSQ 
was developed to screen for the most common psychological disorders found in 
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outpatient mental health settings.  The measure consists of 126 questions assessing 
symptoms within five diagnostic areas: eating disorder, mood disorders, anxiety 
disorders, substance use disorders, and somatoform disorders with an additional 6-item 
psychosis screener.  The PDSQ has shown excellent internal consistency, test-retest 
reliability, concurrent validity, and discriminant validity (Zimmerman & Mattia, 2001).  
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS: Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin, 
1985) is a self-reported measure of global life satisfaction.  SWLS consists of 5-items 
using a 1 through 7 Likert scale.  The total score is calculated by summing all the 5 items.  
The total score can fall into one of six categories: highly satisfied, high score, average 
score, slightly below average score, dissatisfied, and extremely dissatisfied.  SWLS has 
been shown to have excellent internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and convergent 
validity (Pavot, Diener, Colven & Sandvik, 1991). 
The participants completed a demographic questionnaire that asked them to 
identify their age range, gender, level of educational attainment, and the country/state of 
their residence.  Participants were also asked about their marital status and the gender of 
their partner.  Additionally, participants volunteered whether they were currently in 
treatment with the option to provide the type of treatment, cause of treatment, and 
whether they were prescribed psychotropic medication.  The demographic information of 
the sample is reported above. Additionally,  twenty-three participants provided their 
positive treatment status, with eight participants report the type and cause of treatment.  
One hundred and eighty-nine participants reported that they were not in treatment, and 47 
participants chose not to respond. Twenty- five participants volunteered that they were 
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currently taking psychotropic medication with one hundred eighty-six participants 




The sample was reviewed for means (M) and standard deviations (SD), reported 
in Table 1, on belief SOM ratio, Rationality and Irrationality total scores, as well as 
variables of psychological stress (PDSQ Total score) and life satisfaction (SWLS Total 
Score).  When compared to mean total scores of a clinical sample (M = 35.7, SD = 22.01) 
the sample was relatively free of psychological disorders t(226) = -7.71, p < .01 (M = 
23.4, SD = 24) (Perkey, Sinclair, Blais, Stein, Neal, Pierson, and Slavin-Mulford, 2018).  
When compared to mean total scores of the validation sample (M = 23.5, SD = 6.4), the 
sample was just as satisfied with life, t(258) = -1.4, p = .16 (M = 22.8, SD = 7.8) (Diener, 
et.al.,1985).   Similarly, the sample mean for rational beliefs total score was higher (M = 
34.1, SD = 9.3) than the sample mean for irrational beliefs total score (M = 18.5, SD = 
12.3). 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Belief SOM ratio, Rationality, and Irrationality  
Total Scores, Variables of Psychological Stress, and Life Satisfaction. 
Variables Mean SD 
SOM ratio .66 .21 
RB total score 34.1 9.4 
IB total score 18.5 12.3 
PDSQ total score 23.4 24.0 
SWLS total Score 22.8 7.7 
Note: RB = DRLG Rational beliefs; IB = DRLG Irrational beliefs;  
PDSQ = Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire (Normative sample M = 
35.7)(n=226); SWLS = Satisfaction  
with Life Scale (Normative sample M = 23.5). 
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To determine the internal consistency of the DRLG-short form for this sample, 
Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated.  The analysis indicated DRLG – short form to possess 
a high level of internal consistency for this sample (α = .95).  The sample mean for belief 
SOM ratio was M = .66, SD = .21, falling within the positive dialogue range of the 
originally theorized range for optimal functioning.  
The belief SOM ratios were consistent in differentiating between participants 
experiencing psychological distress and those who did not report psychological distress.  
SOM ratio dependently identified participants who met criteria for elevated symptoms of 
depression (PDSQ-Depression > 9) and anxiety (PDSQ-Anxiety >7) with an average 
belief SOM ratio falling within the negative dialogue range to conflict range (Depression 
M = .46, SD = .15; Anxiety M = .50, SD = .19).  While participants without symptoms 
(below clinical cut-off), evidenced belief SOM ratios within the normal range 
(Depression M = .74, SD = .18; Anxiety M = .71, SD = .20).  When examining total 
psychological distress scores (PDSQ Total Score) SOM ratios reflected a similar split 
between participants with subclinical to clinical psychological distress (T score >60).  
Participants reporting clinical levels of psychological distress had on average SOM ratios 
within negative dialogue range (M = .44, SD .13).  On the other hand, participants 
reporting sub-clinical psychological distress had SOM ratios within the positive dialogue 
range (M = .69, SD = .20).  Interestingly, when examining the range of SOM ratio scores 
for total psychological distress markers, participants reporting clinical levels of 
psychological distress ranged between .08 and .65. In contrast, those without significant 
psychological distress ranged from .04 to 1.00 SOM ratio values.  The difference in range 
for the two groups may be indicative of higher levels of irrationality present for the 
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participants with lower SOM ratios (as in the index of negative dialogue or internal 
dialogue of conflict).  
To test our second and third hypotheses, we correlated rational and irrational 
beliefs to the measures of psychological stress (PDSQ), and life satisfaction (SWLS) 
reported in Table 2.  Self-reported psychological stress was significantly positively 
correlated to irrational beliefs, r (226) = .65, p < .01.  Self-reported psychological stress 
was significantly negatively correlated to rational beliefs, r (226) = -.47, p < .01.  
Conversely, self-reported life satisfaction was significantly positively correlated to 
rational beliefs, r (258) = .52, p < .01, and significantly negatively correlated to irrational 
beliefs, r (258) = -.43, p < .01. 
Table 2 
Correlations Between Rational and Irrational Beliefs with Measures of Psychological  
Stress and Life Satisfaction.  
Measures 1 2 3 4 
1. RB  -    
2. IB -.70** -   
3. PDSQ -.47** .65** -  
4. SWLS  .52** -.43** -.41** - 
Note: RB = DRLG Rational beliefs; IB = DRLG Irrational beliefs;  
PDSQ = Psychiatric Diagnostic Screening Questionnaire; SWLS = Satisfaction  
with Life Scale. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
To test our fourth hypothesis, we entered belief SOM ratios with total irrational 
beliefs score and total rational belief scores into a hierarchal regression to determine 
incremental validity of belief SOM ratio, irrational beliefs ,and rational beliefs in 
predicting psychological well-being (SWLS Total Score) and psychological distress 
(PDSQ Total Score).  The results of the hierarchal multiple regression of predicting 
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psychological well-being are described in Table 3.  Rational beliefs were a significant 
predictor of life satisfaction and explained 28% of the variance, F(2, 257) = 50.00, p <  
.0005, R2 = .28.   Belief SOM ratios did not add predictive value beyond rational beliefs 
( = .35, p = .42).  Similarly, irrational beliefs did not add predictive value above rational 
beliefs ( = .11, p = .36). The results of the hierarchal multiple regression analysis of 
predicting psychological distress are described in Table 4.  Irrational beliefs were a 
significant predictor of psychological distress and explained 42% of the variance, F(2, 
225) = 81.01, p < .0005, R2 = .42.  Belief SOM ratios did not add predictive value beyond 
irrational beliefs ( = .19, p = .45).  Rational beliefs did not add predictive value above 
irrational beliefs ( = -.05, p = .78).  
Table 3 
 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Variables Predicting Life Satisfaction. 
 N = 258. SE = Standard Error. Irrationality = Total irrational belief score on the DRLG 














1      .25 .25 85.53 .00 
 Belief SOM 18.86 2.04 .50 .00     
2      .28 .03 50.00 .00 
 Belief SOM 7.37 3.98 .19 .06     
 Rationality .29 .09 .35 .00     
3      .28 .00 33.28 .73 
 Belief SOM 13.12 16.20 .35 .42     
 Rationality .25 .15 .30 .09     
 Irrationality .07 .19 .11 .71     
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Table 4 
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Variables Predicting Psychological 











1      .38 .38 137.10 .00 
 Belief SOM -70.18 5.99 -.62 .00     
2      .42 .03 81.01 .00 
 Belief SOM 9.66 20.88 .09 .64     
 Irrationality 1.41 .35 .73 .00     
3      .42 .00 53.81 .78 
 Belief SOM 21.63 47/74 .19 .65     
 Irrationality 1.54 .58 .80 .01     
 Rationality -.12 .43 -.05 .78     
N = 225. SE = Standard Error. Irrationality = Total irrational belief score on the DRLG 
short form. Rationality = Total rational belief score on the DRLG short form. 
 
 We also investigated whether the order in which variables were entered into the 
hierarchal multiple regression analysis would change the significance of the predictive 
variables. We completed a secondary regression analysis by inputting the variables in 
reverse order and got the same results with RBs predicting life satisfaction and IBs 
predicting psychopathology. 
To test our final hypothesis, we ran a set of regression models with belief SOM 
ratios as a predictor of life satisfaction (SWLS Total score).  We fit the data to linear, 
quadratic, and cubic regression and judged the best fit model with the least error (Figure 
4).  Linear model fit was statistically significant explaining 25% of the variance, F(1, 
256) = 85.53, p < .0005, R2 = .25. The quadratic model fit was statistically significant, 
explaining 26% of variance, F(2, 255) = 44.86, p < .0005, R2 = .26, but did not add 
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explanatory power beyond the linear model ( = -.54, p = .07). The cubic model fit was 
statistically significant F(3, 254) = 29.81, p < .0005, R2 = .26 but did not add explanatory 
power as the best model fit ( = .26, p = .82). We also ran a set of regression models with 
belief SOM ratios as a predictor of psychological distress (PDSQ Total score).  We fit the 
data to linear, quadratic, and cubic regression and judged the best fit model with the least 
error (Figure 5).  Linear model fit was statistically significant explaining 38% of 
variance, F(1, 224) = 137.10, p < .0005, R2 = .38). The quadratic model fit was 
statistically significant, explaining 38% of variance, F(2, 223) = 69.10, p < .0005, R2 
= .38, but did not carry explanatory power beyond the linear model ( = - .29, p = .30). 
The cubic model fit was statistically significant, explaining 40 percent of the variance 
F(3, 222) = 51.05, p < .0005, R2 = .40, and did add explanatory power beyond the other 










Curve Model Fit for the Interaction Between Endorsement of Psychological Stress and 






The original 1986 SOM theory proposed that individuals balance their positive 
and negative cognitions asymmetrically within an internal computation system 
represented with a ratio [positive cognitions / (positive + negative cognitions) (Schwartz 
& Garamoni, 1986; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1989). The authors supposed that the 
asymmetrical balance of evaluations was an evolutionary adaptation, allowing the 
individual to pay special attention to negative events. However, research on the model 
established that the optimal ratio first proposed as .62 was incorrect, as many 
psychologically well-adapted individuals were functioning within higher ranges of the 
ratio.  As a result, Schwartz reformulated the original SOM theory into the Balanced 
State of Mind Model (BSOM), identifying the .62 ratio as a subnormal function with two 
new designations: 0.72 ratio as the normal functioning set point, and .81 as the optimal 
functioning set point.  We hypothesized that the optimal ratio was not founded due to 
characteristics of measurement used in previous research, namely self-statements.  
Instead, we proposed that the optimal ratio may be found when examining the theory 
using more stable constructs, such as irrational and rational beliefs embedded within the 
cognitive therapy of Albert Ellis: Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT: Ellis 
1994).  Overall, we found that an optimal ratio was not substantiated when examining the 
SOM theory within the REBT framework. Our findings indicate individuals predictably 
experience less psychological distress the more rational and less irrational are their 
beliefs. 
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First, it was important for us to establish the relationship rational and irrational 
beliefs have with measures of psychopathology and well-being in order to relate beliefs 
to outcomes the same way negative and positive cognitions have been linked to outcomes 
in past research.  For example, previous research had shown a clear link between negative 
(contributing) cognitions and psychopathology and positive (protective) cognitions and 
well-being (Beck, 1963; Beevers, Wells, & Miller 2007; Chakhssi, et al., 2018; Teasdale, 
1983).  This study had found that rational and irrational beliefs are linked to measures of 
psychological adjustment.  Furthermore, the beliefs correlated in the predicted direction.  
The current investigation demonstrated irrational beliefs to significantly positively 
correlated to measures of psychopathology and significantly negatively correlated with 
measures of life satisfaction.  While rational beliefs were significantly positively 
correlated with measures of life satisfaction and significantly negatively correlated to 
measures of psychopathology.  These findings help us link rational and irrational beliefs 
to measures of psychological adjustment in the same way negative and positive 
cognitions have been linked to outcome measures in previous research. 
 Next, we investigated the SOM ratios derived from rational and irrational beliefs.  
Average SOM ratios for the overall sample fell within the positive dialogue range based 
on original SOM indices but were different from the optimal ratio balance set point 
of .62. Since our sample was relatively free of psychological stress and satisfaction with 
life we would expect the overall sample’s mean SOM ratio to reflect the perfect balance 
hypothesis.  However, the sample mean for the SOM ratio was higher.  When further 
investigated, individuals who were more satisfied with life and less plagued by 
psychological distress had SOM ratios congruent to normal functioning setpoints 
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proposed within the BSOM.  These findings replicate previous research when 
investigating negative and positive cognitions.  As such, our hypothesis was refuted that 
finding the optimal balance may be resolved by assessing stable cognitive constructs, 
such as, attitudes and beliefs within the REBT framework.  Research has consistently 
shown, including current investigation, that many healthy individuals have much higher 
ratios than the hypothesized optimal balance ratio of .62.  These findings hold true both 
when measuring self-statements and when measuring beliefs.  
We also noted a specific difference in the range of SOM ratios between 
individuals endorsing clinical levels of depression and anxiety versus those who reported 
fewer symptoms.  In our sample, participants who endorsed sub-clinical levels of 
depression and anxiety, on average, endorsed more rational beliefs than irrational beliefs, 
as represented by higher SOM ratios for this group of participants (positive monologue 
range).  Conversely, participants who endorsed more irrational beliefs than rational 
beliefs (negative dialogue range) also endorsed clinical levels of psychological distress 
(depression and anxiety) and had lower SOM ratios than the healthy participants.  The 
same held true of the average SOM ratios when participants were split according to their 
endorsement of overall psychological distress.  As such, belief SOM ratios were able to 
differentiate between healthy and unhealthy participants.  Additionally, these findings 
support the assertion that negative (contributory) mental states as represented by lower 
SOM ratios (as in the index of negative dialogue or internal dialogue of conflict) and are 
linked to higher levels of psychological distress. 
Our findings supported previous research in consistently finding SOM ratios to 
differentiate between unhealthy and healthy groups.  Nasby and Russel (1997) reported 
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that soldiers with PTSD were differentiated from soldiers who did not experience PTSD 
by their SOM ratios when holding combat exposure and pre- and post-service variables 
constant.  Soldiers with PTSD reported SOMs within the negative monologue range (.35) 
while non-PTSD counterparts reported SOMs within the positive dialogue range (.68).  
Moreover, Ronan and Kendall (1997) argued in support of the use of SOM ratios as it 
distinguished between normal and distressed children, enabling tracking of incremental 
progress as well as providing information on the mechanism of change by considering 
positive, negative cognitions and their relationship to each other.  As such our findings 
reaffirm that the SOM ratio may be applied to any number of assessment tools that 
employ both negative and positive aspects of a content area in order to track treatment 
progress. 
When investigating negative and positive cognitions SOM was consistent in 
illustrating the utility of the SOM ratios for predicting performance or treatment 
outcomes.  Baggett (1994) investigated whether SOM ratios would predict a 
psychotherapeutic change in a sample of depressed patients.  The study found that SOM 
ratios in pre-treatment positively predicted outcomes beyond the presence of personality 
disorder, educational achievement, and severity of depression.  Another study of a large 
sample of undergraduates found that the ratio predicted the difference in the severity of 
symptoms beyond consideration of exclusively negative or exclusively positive 
cognitions, providing further support for the predictive value of SOM ratios in the 
application of treatment (Wong, 2010). 
Furthermore, Bruch et al. (1991) examined the predictive power of SOM ratios 
for a sample of patients with social phobia undergoing CBT.  The authors argued for the 
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SOM as an empirically testable model that enables practitioners and researchers to 
capture the processes of cognitive shifts in psychotherapy.  Accordingly, research 
supported the dynamic relationship (SOM ratios) of negative and positive cognitions as a 
stronger predictive of outcome measure than positive and negative cognitions alone.  
For this reason, we aimed to investigate whether belief SOM ratios would predict 
psychological distress or well-being.  Conversely, our study found that within the REBT 
framework, IBs were a stronger predictor of psychological distress than rational beliefs or 
SOM ratios and RBs were a stronger predictor of life satisfaction.  SOM ratios, when 
compared to IBs and RBs, did not add explanatory power.  As such, irrationality has been 
found as the stronger predictor of psychological distress in our sample and rationality was 
found as the stronger predictor of life satisfaction. However, our study did not track 
change over time as did the aforementioned investigation, which may have affected our 
findings.  We propose that the dynamic relationship of contributing and protective 
elements over the course of treatment may be a stronger predictor of overall outcome, 
while irrational beliefs may be a stronger predictor as an initial measure of psychological 
distress.  We believe more research is warranted to examine this hypothesis by using 
SOM ratios derived from beliefs to track treatment progress.  
Previous research supported a linear relationship between SOM ratio and an 
individual’s adaptation on various criterion measures, suggesting that even extremely 
positive states-of-mind are adaptive (Amsel & Fichten, 1998).  The current study found 
the best model fit for a linear relationship between SOM ratios and measures of well-
being. Our investigation of the link between belief SOM ratios and psychopathology 
indicated a linear relationship to have the best model fit. These findings point affirm the 
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previously support a linear relationship between RBs and IBs outcome measures of life 
satisfaction and psychological distress. Our lack of finding the curvilinear relationship 
between psychological well-being and rationality supported previous findings when the 
SOM model was tested within the CBT theory.  
Future Research 
Our research findings support the original formulation of Schwartz and 
Garamoni’s  (1986, 1989) work in that individuals balance their cognitive states 
asymmetrically.   Research findings of an optimal balance approximating the golden 
section ratio have been inconsistent.  However, the findings of the asymmetry in the 
balance of individuals’ cognitive experience have been consistent.  It may be proposed 
that little negative experience is needed for adaptive salience against the backdrop of 
mostly positive mental events.  And so, the theory does reflect the adaptive quality for the 
salience of internal negative states against the backdrop of primarily positive internal 
states.  
Overall, SOM has been shown useful in differentiating between levels of severity 
of symptoms and tracking people’s progress in therapy relative to others.  Additionally, 
the SOM possesses concurrent validity useful in distinguishing clinical versus normal 
groups and can serve to compare groups between therapies and disorders in a 
standardized way.  SOM ratios are a great way to explore the complex relationships 
between self-reported beliefs or cognitions in the attempt to understand the dynamic 
relationships of thoughts and beliefs as contributory outcome factors.  
Amsel and Fichten (1998) named several advantages for using ratio scores 
namely that ratios simplify data analysis by avoiding working with positively skewed 
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distributions and overcomplicated statistical operations while allowing for comparison of 
different evaluation methods.  The authors offered several suggestions to refine the 
accuracy of SOM by including a zero point on the scale of self-statement inventories or 
converting existing scores to have a zero value.  SOM ratios allow for comparison across 
methodologies and studies.  The authors made a strong argument for reporting both SOM 
scores and frequencies of valanced statements.  The study found that frequencies of 
valanced thought and SOM ratios yield different information.  The authors asserted that 
different frequencies of negative and positive statements could yield the same overall 
score, while a ratio score relates the relative balance of positive to negative cognitions or 
affect serving as a more accurate barometer of change in the valence of cognitions 
throughout psychotherapeutic treatment.  
Understanding the role of positive and negative cognitions in psychological 
adjustment is an essential aspect of CBT practice.  The current study enabled us to 
explore further the dynamic relationship between irrational and rational beliefs and their 
interaction with psychopathology. Future research may focus on identifying, particularly 
where the breakdown from healthy to un-healthy balance begins.  By investigating a set 
cut-off may enable for identification of individuals with a strong need for intervention as 
well as formalize treatment progress across treatment paradigms.  The current 
investigation’s findings are incongruent with previous research of the nonlinear 
relationship between SOM ratios and well-being.  Further exploration of the nonlinear 
relationship between SOM ratios and measures of well-being is warranted to replicate or 




 The greatest limitation of the current study was the make-up of the sample.  The 
sample underrepresented minority populations when compared to U.S. Census population 
statistics.  The latest U.S. census recorded 60% of the population as Caucasian, 12% as 
Black, 18 percent as Hispanic, 1% as American Indian, and 6% as Asian (Census 
Bureau’s Community Survey, 2008-2018).  Secondly, our sample was relatively well 
educated.  According to the Census Bureau’s website, just 32.2 percent of the U.S. 
population over the age of 18 holds a 4-year college degree or higher. Our sample 
consisted of 68.3 percent of participants who reported earning a 4-year college degree or 
higher. 
Furthermore, our sample was relatively free of psychological distress and 
relatively satisfied with life as compared to means from validating studies of these 
measures.  As such, our sample might not be representative of the population in terms of 
education, ethnic, and racial background, as well as relative well-being.  These 





Implication for the Practice of School Psychology 
An estimate of 13 - 20 % of children in the U.S. are effected by mental health 
disorders (CDC, 2018).  The majority of children with mental health disorders do not 
receive treatment. However, the majority of those children who do receive mental health 
services, access these services in a school setting (USDHHS, 1999).  Some meta-analytic 
studies have supported the use of counseling and psychotherapy as an effective mental 
health service for children in schools, with some interventions working better than others 
(Prout & Prout, 1998; Reese, Prout, Zirkelback & Anderson, 2010; Whiston, Wendi Lee, 
Rahardja & Eder, 2011). Additionally, school psychologists’ training uniquely places 
them in a position to be able to choose evidence-based counseling and psychotherapy 
interventions with consideration for student’s individual needs, strengths, and weaknesses 
(Hughes & Theodore, 2009).   
Current trends and initiatives in education have highlighted the importance of 
establishing accountability by empirically evaluating programs and interventions at all 
levels of service delivery in schools (Dimmitt, 2009).  Large caseloads, assignments to 
multiple schools as well as a focus on identification of children for special education 
services are all variables constraining school psychologists from engaging in the 
provision of direct mental health services to students (Hanchon & Fernald, 2013).  Efforts 
to ease the delivery of evidence-based psychotherapeutic treatment may contribute to 
increasing the school psychologists’ role in providing mental health services in school.   
One way to ease the burden on school psychologists is to have an assessment tool 
that can cut across interventions, and specific problems addressed while remaining 
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empirically accountable for treatment progress. Utilizing the SOM model may provide an 
assessment system with any tool consisting of dichotomous measurement (i.e. positive-
negative thoughts; positive-negative affect; rational-irrational beliefs), which may be 
sensitive to the constraints within mental health service provision in schools while 
responsive to the necessity of monitoring treatment. 
The current study further established the ability of the SOM model to be applied 
across measures of cognition, affect, and beliefs when both protective and contributing 
factors are assessed.  The importance of the SOM model in the practice of school 
psychology is in the model’s ability to conform to any assessment tool which delineates 
between positive and negative poles, whether it measures cognition, affect, or beliefs.  
Our findings reaffirm that the SOM ratio may be applied to any number of assessment 
tools that employ both negative and positive aspects of a content area to identify 
individuals who are experiencing heightened psychological distress.  Moreover, SOM 
ratios can be applied as a tool for tracking treatment progress as the ratio allows for 
incremental monitoring in the rise of protective cognitions or beliefs (Schwartz & 
Michelson, 1987; Schwartz et al., 2002).   
Limitations remain in the transfer of SOM ratio use with adults to a population of 
children in school.  For example, Hogendoorn et al. found that anxious children reported 
more negative thoughts than controls, had less positive thoughts than controls, and had 
lower SOM ratios than controls.  Additionally, both positive and negative thoughts 
predicted anxiety levels in normal children.  The study found that non-anxious children 
had SOM’s on average of .80 while anxious children ranged from .67 to .70.  Although 
the study supported the idea that quantities of protective and contributing cognitions 
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differ between anxious and normal children in particular ways, the exact set points as an 
average of a group were unclear.  Further research is necessary to establish whether the 
difference in SOM ratios between anxious/depressed children is significantly different 
from children not experiencing psychological distress. 
The current study has aided in reviewing and extending the present research base 
to bolster future research with the SOM as it is applied both in clinical and school 
settings.  Previous research on SOM ratios when evaluating children has been sparse.  
Many more studies are necessary to understand the interaction and the dynamic 
relationship between protective and contributing factors affecting children’s 
psychological balance.  The model’s ability to conform to different assessment and 
treatment paradigms must be further explored with samples of healthy and 
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